
HEALTH
ECONOMICS
AN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION PERSPECTIVE
XAVIER MARTINEZ-GIRALT AND PEDRO BARROS

Health Economics

An Industrial Organization perspective

Pedro Pita Barros and
Xavier Martinez-Giralt

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To *sofia. Henrique and Carolina*
To *Montse. Ivette and William*

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